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Dans cet article, nous adoptons les hypothèses habituelles de l’approche col-
lective, à savoir, l’individualisme et l’e¢cacité, pour étudier l’o¤re de travail
du ménage. L’innovation théorique est double. D’une part, nous incorporons
dans le cadre initial la décision de participer au marché du travail. D’autre
part, nous abandonnons l’hypothèse de linéarité de la contrainte budgetaire.
Nous montrons alors que (i) des éléments structurels du processus de déci-
sion peuvent être retrouvés, et (ii) des restrictions testables sont générées de
l’observation des o¤res de travail du ménage. Nous examinons également,
pour ce modèle, comment faire des simulations de réformes …scales.
Abstract:
In this paper, we adopt the usual assumptions of the collective approach, i.e.
individualismand e¢ciency, to study household labor supply. The theoretical
innovation is twofold. First, we incorporate the decision to participate in the
labor market in the initial setting. Second, we abandon the assumption of
linearity of the budget constraint. We show that (i) structural elements such
aspreferencesorthe outcomeof thedecision processcan be recovered, and (ii)
testablerestrictionsaregenerated fromtheobservation of the household labor
supplies. We also examine, for this model, how to simulate the incidence of
…scal reforms.
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JEL classi…cation: H31, J221 Introduction
Traditionally, in micro-economics, household behavior is derived from the
maximization of a unique well-behaved utility function. However, this ‘uni-
tary’ approach has been severely criticized in recent years. At the theoretical
level, it is not based on methodological individualism, which requires indi-
viduals to be characterized by their own preferences. Moreover, it cannot
generally be used to study the intra-household distribution of welfare. At
the empirical level, the speci…c restrictions imposed by the unitary model
have received little empirical support, if any. In particular, the income pool-
ing hypothesis — according to which only total exogenous income, and not
its distribution across household members, matters for labor supply and con-
sumption decisions — has been strongly rejected in many studies (see Lund-
berg and Pollak (1998) for a survey of this literature).
Chiappori (1988, 1992) has proposed an alternative model of labor supply
based upon a ‘collective’ representation of household behavior. He assumes
that each household member is characterized by his (her) own utility function
and that decisions result in Pareto-e¢cient outcomes. He shows that when
agents are egoistic and consumption is private, these simple assumptions
allow to generate testable restrictions and recover, from observed behavior,
certain elements of the decision process, such as individual preferences and
the rule that determines the distribution of utilities within the household.1
Thisopens avery interestingareaofempirical researchon theintra-household
impact of policy reforms — an issue which is completely disregarded by
the unitary approach. However these results are derived for the simplest
possible case. The possibility of nonparticipation in the labor market is
neglected and the budget constraint is assumed to be linear. To properly
assess the collective framework as a useful tool for policy analysis, the future
development of the theory must address these issues. This is the motivation
for the current paper which may be used as a theoretical kit for applied
econometricians.
In Section 2, we discuss the main assumptions that are made. Besides
individualism and Pareto-e¢ciency, we suppose that agents are egoistic and
consumption is exclusively private.
In Section 3, we postulate that each member chooses not to work if his
1Moreover, Fortin and Lacroix (1997), Chiappori et al. (2001), and Blundell et al.
(2001) provide empirical results which are consistent with the collective approach.
1(her) respective market wage is below a reservation value. This property does
not stem from the theoretical background, as for the unitary model, but has
to be explicitly assumed. We then show that Chiappori’s conclusions are
still valid if either the husband or the wife (but not both) does not work.
This result completes and clari…es in some respects a proposition given in
Blundell et al. (2001) who consider that the husband’s choices are discrete.
It is expected to be particularly useful for future empirical applications. The
widespread practice for treating the nonparticipation problem indeed con-
sists in leaving households with nonworking persons out of the sample. This
explains why the estimates of the structural parameters often lack precision
and may be subject to selection biases. The theoretical results of this sec-
tion can be used to implement the Full Information Maximum Likelihood
(FIML) method on a sample with jointly working and nonworking persons.
This should also increase the number of observations used in the estimation
procedure.
In Section 4, wegeneralize the previousresult tothecasewhere the budget
constraint is nonlinear. Speci…cally, the model that we develop can be used
to account for the progressiveness of income tax. This feature is particularly
attractive judging by the quantity of literature during the last two decades
on the disincentive e¤ects of income tax. However, past studies are always
based on the unitary approach which is empirically rejected. Consequently,
they may be seriously misleading. This is also underlined by Apps and Rees
(1988) and more recently, Brett (1998) who demonstrate the importance of
considering the intra-household e¤ects of …scal reforms in welfare analysis.
In this section, we also show that, using the present framework, the impact
of changes in tax parameters on the intra-household distribution of welfare
and on the household labor supply can be measured using current data.
In Section 5, we conclude with a summary and some general considera-
tions.
2 Collective Household Labor Supply
We consider the case of a married couple (m and f) in a single period setting.
The husband’s and the wife’s labor supply are respectively denoted by Lm
and Lf with market wages wm and wf. Aggregate (Hicksian) consumption
of each spouse is respectively denoted by Cm and Cf with prices set to one.
Nonlabor income is denoted by y. For convenience, the spouses’ total time
2endowment is normalized at one. Finally, we adopt the following assumption
on preferences.
Assumption A1 Each household member is characterized by speci…c util-
ity functions of the form: ui(1 ¡ Li;Ci): These functions are both strongly
concave, in…nitely di¤erentiable and strictly increasing in all their arguments
on IR3
++, with limCi!0ui(1 ¡ Li;Ci) = limLi!1ui(1 ¡Li;Ci) = ¡1.
Three remarks are in order. First, we suppose that there is no public
consumption and no domestic production. Second, the household members
are said to be “egoistic” in that their utility only depends on their own
consumption and leisure.2 Third, the two conditions on limits permit ruling
out the cases where individual consumption or leisure is equal to zero, as
shown below.
The main originality of the e¢ciency approach lies in the fact that the
household decisions result in Pareto e¢cient outcomes and that no additional
assumption is made about the process. Explicitly, we say:
Assumption A2 The outcome of the decision process is Pareto e¢cient.
This assumption has a good deal of intuitive appeal. The household is one
of the preeminent examples of a repeated game. Therefore, it is plausible that
agents …nd mechanisms to support e¢cient outcomes since cooperation often
emerges as a long term equilibrium of repeated noncooperative relations.
Provided that the budget set is convex, e¢ciency means that there exists
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where S is the household budget set which is assumed to be convex and
compact. It generally depends on wages and income.
2However, all the results immediately extend to the case of “altruistic” agents in a
Beckerian sense, with utilities represented by Wi(um(1¡Lm;Cm);uf(1¡Lf;Cf)); where
Wi(¢) is a strictly increasing function. See Chiappori (1992) for a discussion of this point.
3To obtain well-behaved labor supply functions and consumption functions
(instead of correspondences), we assume that the scalar ¹ 2]0;1[ is a single-
valued and in…nitely di¤erentiable function of (wm;wf;y). The underlying
idea is that, within a bargaining context, the threat point may well depend
on nonlabor income and the wage that the spouses receive when they work.
If so, most cooperative equilibrium concepts will imply that ¹ is a function
of wm;wf and y.
We denote the solutions to (¯ P) by ¹ Lm, ¹ Lf, ¹ Cm and ¹ Cf as functions of
wm;wf and y. Let us remark that ¹ Cm and ¹ Cf are treated as unobservable,
and we can observe the aggregate consumption only at the household level.
We then say that a pair of labor supplies ¹ Lm and ¹ Lf is consistent with
collective rationality conditionally on S if and only if there exist a pair of
functions ¹ Cm and ¹ Cf and some function ¹, such that, for any (wm;wf;y),
(¹ Lm; ¹ Lf; ¹ Cm; ¹ Cf) is a solution to (¯ P). This de…nition does not postulate a
particular form for the budget set S.3
3 The Linear Case
In this section, we consider the case of a linear budget constraint and extend
the main conclusions of Chiappori (1988, 1992) to corner solutions.
3.1 Basic Framework
To begin with, we introduce the following assumption on the budget set.
Assumption S1 The budget set S is given by wmLm+wfLf+y > Cm+Cf,
1 > Lm > 0, 1 > Lf > 0, Cm > 0 and Cf > 0.
Because of A1, (¯ P) always has an interior solution for consumption and
leisure: Ci > 0 and Li < 1 for any i (if the budget set is not empty).
3Nevertheless, the collective rationality of a pair of labor supplies can be assessed only
for a given budget set. In fact, any pair of labor supplies ¹ Lm and ¹ Lf can be collectively
rationalized by an in…nity of budget sets. To show this, it is su¢cient to de…ne a budget set
S¤ which consists, for any bundle (w¤
m;w¤





f;y¤), and any value for the household consumption. If so, the pair of labor
supplies ¹ Lm and ¹ Lf is obviously consistent with collective rationality conditionally on S¤.
4This seems realistic since consumption is aggregated and leisure is arbitrarily
de…ned.
The next step is to de…ne what we call the sharing rule. Indeed, when
the agents are egoistic and the budget constraint is linear, e¢ciency implies
that the allocation of resources can be decentralized.
Lemma 1 Let (¹ Lm; ¹ Lf) be a pair of labor supplies consistent with collective
rationality conditionally on S1. Then, there exist a pair of functions ( ¹ Cm; ¹ Cf)
and a pair of functions (½m;½f), with
P
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i and L
i > 0, (P0
i)
for any (wm;wf;y) 2 IR3
++.
Proof. An application of the Second Theoremof Welfare Economics. Q.E.D.
This lemma states that the decision process can be represented in two
stages. First, members divide the nonlabor income according to some pre-
determined rule which is a function of wm;wf and y. Second, they inde-
pendently choose consumption and labor supply subject to their own budget
constraint. The spouses’ labor supplies, for an interior solution, then have






f(wf;y ¡ ½(wm;wf;y)), (2)
where ½ = ½m and ½f = y ¡½. In the remainder of this paper, the husband’s
share ½ is called the ‘sharing rule’. It can be either positive or negative.
3.2 Identi…cation and Testability
A preliminary remark to make is that, in what follows, wages are assumed to
always be observed by the economist, even when the wife or the husband does
not work. This is not realistic but, in practical terms, wages can generally
be estimated by an auxiliary equation. This point is discussed below.
In the standard unitary framework, the participation decision is modeled
in terms of a reservation wage de…ned by the fact that, at this wage, the
5agent is indi¤erent between working and not working. In the present con-
text, we can naturally de…ne a pair of reservation wages in the same way.4
Nevertheless, we need additional assumptions to ensure the existence of a
well-behaved participation frontier. To show this, we introduce the following








where Fx is the partial di¤erential of function F with respect to variable
x. This equation is the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and
consumption computed along the axis Li = 0 for a given endowment ½i (and




as a function of the partner’s wage and nonlabor income. Therefore, the
uniqueness of the reservation wage does not result from the theoretical frame-
work that we have adopted, but must be explicitly postulated.5 We use the
following assumption.


























This condition is satis…ed if the impact of wm and wf on the individual
shares is “small enough” in absolute value. It is not expected to be very
restrictive and it greatly simpli…es the analysis. Speci…cally, R1 means that
the system of equations $m and $f is a contraction with respect to the
variables wm and wf. There are two corollaries. First, for any y, the pair
of functions $m and $f has a unique …xed point with respect to wm and
4Blundell et al. (2001) underline that, if a member is indi¤erent between working
and not working, his (her) partner must be indi¤erent as well. This obviously stems
from e¢ciency. Let us assume, for example, that at the reservation wage, the husband is
indi¤erent between working and not working. If his participation entails a strict gain for
the wife, then the husband’s nonparticipation is clearly Pareto-ine¢cient.
5However, the existence of the reservation wage is always assured because, for …xed wj
and y, the function $i is upper-bounded: $i(wi;wj;y) < 1 for any wi:
6wf. Then, for any y, there exists one and only one pair of wages, denoted by
^ wm(y) and ^ wf(y), such that both household members are indi¤erent between
working and not working. Second, for any wj and y, each function $i has a
unique …xed point with respect to wi.6 Then there exists, for each member i,
a function °i(wj;y) de…ned on IR2
++ such that member i participates in the
labor market if and only if wi > °i(wj;y). Consequently, IR3
++ is partitioned
into four connected sets as shown in Figure 1.
In this …gure, we show that the spouses do not work when their respective
market wage is below a reservation value. Furthermore, for a given y, the
participation frontiers °i have only one intersection (according to R1) and
are convex with respect to the partner’s wage. This convexity is not formally
implied by the present setting. A possible interpretation is as follows. When
the husband (wife) does not work, an increase in his (her) wage probably has
a positive e¤ect on his (her) bargaining power. If so, the wife’s (husband’s)
share decreases and, if leisure is normal, her (his) reservation wage declines.
When the husband (wife) works, an increase in his (her) wage also has a
positive e¤ect on the household labor income which may compensate for
the increase in the husband’s (wife’s) bargaining power: her (his) share is
expected to rise at some point.
To simplify the analysis, we introduce some de…nitions. The spouses’
participation set, i.e. the set of (wm;wf;y) such that both spouses choose
to work, is denoted by P. The wife’s nonparticipation set, i.e. the set of
(wm;wf;y) such that the wife (and only the wife) chooses not to work, is
denoted by Nf. Similarly, the husband’s nonparticipation set is denoted by
Nm. The spouses’ nonparticipation set, i.e. the set of (wm;wf;y) such that
both spouses choose not to work, is denoted by N.
6This comes from the fact that, for any wj and y, the function $i is a contraction with




i j (a simple consequence
of R1).
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Figure 1: Participation and Non-participation Sets
At this stage, two remarks are in order. First, it can be shown that
the labor supplies ¹ Lm and ¹ Lf as well as the sharing rule ½ are in…nitely
di¤erentiable in all their arguments on P, int(Ni) and int(N).7 However,
these functions are generally nondi¤erentiable along the participation fron-
tiers. Second, when both partners do not participate in the labor market,
there is nothing that can be said about identi…cation or testability: the only
information at the economist’s disposal concerns the household expenditure
which is exogenously given by nonlabor income. Consequently, we assume
that (wm;wf;y) 2 R where R is a partition of IR3
++ de…ned by
(wm;wf;y) 2 R i¤ ¹ L
f 6= 0 or ¹ L
m 6= 0.
That is, at least one of the labor supplies corresponds to an interior solution
7This result comes from the smoothness of ui and ¹ and the application of the Implicit
Function Theorem on the …rst order conditions of (¯ P). See Magnus and Neudecker (1988,
p. 143, Th. A3) for an appropriate version of this theorem.
8of (¯ P). Identi…cation of the sharing rule and other structural elements can
possibly be attained on R, but not outside.8
The following theorem establishes that some structural elements of the
decision process can be retrieved from the observation of both labor supplies.
Theorem 1 Let (¹ Lm; ¹ Lf) be a pair of labor supplies, satisfying regularity
conditions listed in Lemma 2–4, consistent with collective rationality condi-
tionally on S1. Let us assume R1. Then the sharing rule ½ is identi…ed up
to an additive constant ² on R. Moreover, for each choice of ², preferences
represented by um and uf are uniquely identi…ed. Finally, the labor sup-
plies have to satisfy testable restrictions under the form of partial di¤erential
equations on P.
The proof of this theorem follows in stages. First, we consider the identi-
…cation of the sharing rule in the spouses’ participation set. This is followed
by a proof of identi…cation in the nonparticipation sets of each household
member. Finally, identi…cation of preferences follows.
3.2.1 Identi…cation in the Spouses’ Participation Set
This is the only case which is implicitly considered by Chiappori (1988, 1992).
For any (wm;wf;y) 2 P such that ¹ Lm
y ¢ ¹ Lf














The …rst result, which is well-known, is that the sharing rule can be identi-
…ed and testable constraints are generated on P if regularity conditions are
satis…ed.
Lemma 2 Let us assume that ¹ Lm
y ¢ ¹ Lf
y 6= 0 and ABy ¡ Bwf 6= AyB ¡ Awm
for any (wm;wf;y) 2 P. Then the sharing rule is identi…ed on P up to a
constant. In addition, labor supplies have to satisfy some restrictions under
the form of partial di¤erential equations on P.
8Of course, this is no longer true if additional information is used. For example, Donni
(2001) uses the observation of a system of commodity demands to identify the sharing rule
when both household members are rationed.
9Proof. See Chiappori (1988, 1992). Q.E.D.
We only give a sketch of the proof. From the functional structure of the
labor supplies (1) and (2), we obtain two partial di¤erential equations:
½wf ¡ A½y = 0 and ½wm ¡ B½y = ¡B:
This is a system of partial di¤erential equations in ½ which can be solved if
it is di¤erentiated with respect to wm;wf and y and if the cross-derivative
restrictions are taken into account; it de…nes the sharing rule up to a con-
stant.
We now consider the identi…cation when one member does not work.
3.2.2 Identi…cation in the Wife’s Nonparticipation Set
We start with the case where only the husband works, i.e. wf 6 °f(wm;y).








In addition, along the wife’s participation frontier, we have the following




This function is de…ned on the set If of (wm;y) such that wm > ^ wm(y).
The following lemma states that, under regularity conditions, the sharing
rule is de…ned on Nf.
Lemma 3 Let us assume that limwf"°f ¹ Lm
y 6= 0 and a ¢ °f
y 6= ¡1 for any
(wm;y) 2 If and ¹ Lm
y 6= 0 for any (wm;wf;y) 2 int(Nf). Then the sharing
rule is identi…ed up to a constant on Nf.
Proof. The basic idea is that the derivatives of the sharing rule from the pre-
ceding lemma provide boundary conditions for the partial di¤erential equa-
tion:
½wf ¡ A½y = 0: (3)
10From standard theorems in partial di¤erential equation theory, this de…nes
the sharing rule (up to an additive constant) provided that the following
condition is ful…lled. First, we write (3) as 5½ ¢ ~ u = 0 where 5½ is the
gradient of ½ and ~ u is the vector (0;1;¡A). Then, the condition is that ~ u
is not tangent to the wife’s participation frontier. Since the equation of this
frontier is wf ¡ °f(wm;y) = 0 and, given that on the frontier A coincides
with a, this condition states that 1 + a ¢ °f
y 6= 0, for all (wm;y) 2 If: If this
condition is ful…lled on the frontier, then the partial di¤erential equation
together with the boundary condition de…nes ½ up to an additive constant.
Q.E.D.
The intuition of the reasoning is illustrated in Figure 1. From Lemma
2, the values of the partials are identi…ed on the frontier of participation,
represented by the lower curve in bold. These values provide boundary con-
ditions for the partial di¤erential equation (3). The latter, characterized by
the vector …eld ~ u in Nf, indicates the direction in which the sharing rule
is constant. That is, it de…nes the indi¤erence surfaces of the sharing rule
which, under the regularity conditions of Lemma 3, pass through the wife’s
participation frontier. An important remark is that this identi…cation result
is local rather than global. Additional conditions are required to recover the
sharing rule on the whole of the wife’s nonparticipation set. However, this
local result is certainly su¢cient for empirical applications.
3.2.3 Identi…cation in the Husband’s Nonparticipation Set
We now consider the case where only the wife works, i.e. wm 6 °m(wf;y).
The reasoning is exactly the same as before. We have the following de…nition









In addition, along the husband’s participation frontier, we have the following




This function is de…ned on the set Im of (wf;y) such that wf > ^ wf(y).
The following lemma states that, under regularity conditions, the sharing
rule is de…ned on Nm.
11Lemma 4 Let us assume that limwm"°m ¹ Lf
y 6= 0 and b ¢ °m
y 6= ¡1 for any
(wf;y) 2 Im and ¹ Lf
y 6= 0 for any (wm;wf;y) 2 int(Nm). Then the sharing
rule is identi…ed up to a constant on Nm.
Proof. The proof is exactly the same as the preceding one. Q.E.D.
Finally, knowing the rule allows us to determine each member’s actual
budget constraint and to compute preferences in the usual way.
This theorem must be related to a previous result given by Blundell et
al. (2001). Using a similar proof, those authors show that the sharing rule
can be retrieved up to a constant when the wife’s labor supply is continuous
and the husband’s labor supply is discrete (working or not working).
3.3 A Simple Parametric Example
To illustrate the preceding results, we consider a very simple example of
functional form. We assume that when both spouses work, the labor supplies
are as follows:
L









We also assume that if the wife does not work, the husband’s labor supply
switches regime, i.e. the parameters change:
L




However, the parameters must satisfy certain restrictions for the labor supply
to be continuous along the frontier. We must have the following relation:
A
0w = a
0w + s ¢ (b
0w); (6)
where s is a free parameter. Indeed, along the participation frontier, by
de…nition, the last term of (6) vanishes, and consequently A0¢w = a0¢w, i.e.
the labor supply is continuous. Strictly speaking, the constraints implied by
(6) do not constitute a test of the collective approach but rather a test of the
12auxiliary assumptions (in particular, the continuity of ¹ and the convexity
of S).
We consider the identi…cation on the spouses’ participation set and use
the de…nitions given in Chiappori (1992). First, we retrieve the sharing rule:





















with ¢ = a4b3 ¡ a3b4, and k0 is an unknown constant. Furthermore, the
collective rationality implies aconstraint: a5b3 = a3b5. Finally, the structural
















2(y ¡ ½); (10)
where the parameters Zi
0;Zi
1;Zi
2 can be uniquely identi…ed (once the constant
k0 has been chosen), with Zi
1 > 0 and Zi
2 6 0 by Slutsky Negativity. The
utility function is well-known and can be retrieved (e.g., Hausman (1981)).
We now consider the identi…cation on the wife’s nonparticipation set. On
this set, the sharing rule is de…ned by a partial di¤erential equation and the
fact that it is continuous along the participation frontier. We assume that
the solution of this problem is given by a sharing rule with the following
functional form:




This function must be equal to (7) along the participation frontier. It means





where r is a free parameter.9 This unique degree of freedom vanishes if we use
the partial di¤erential equation (3) which is valid on this nonparticipation
9For the model to be logically consistent, it may be useful to suppose that this parame-
ter is nonnegative. Otherwise, the sharing rule (11), combined with the ‘structural’ labor








This yields three algebraic equations. If we use (6), (8) and (12), we show
that these equations are redundant and we obtain: r = b3 ¢ s=¢: Since the
theory establishes that the model is exactly identi…ed, we may conclude that
this solution is unique. Finally, the same analysis can be performed in the
husband’s nonparticipation set. This is left to the reader.
To estimate this model, the next step is to make some allowance for
unobservable heterogeneity in the labor supplies (4) and (5).10 Since wages
are unobserved for nonparticipants, we must also specify a stochastic model
for explaining market wages. In this case, the proof of the identi…cation
raises further theoretical di¢culties which are beyond the scope of this paper.
Blundell et al. (2001) investigate this issue within the context of a linear
model. They show that the presence of unobservable heterogeneity does not
invalidate the main conclusions. Broadly speaking, a necessary condition
for the identi…cation in this context is that there exists a variable which
in‡uences the wife’s (husband’s) wage without a¤ecting the sharing rule and
the husband’s (wife’s) wage. If we accept this result, the reduced model,
given by (4) and (5), can be estimated using the usual techniques (FIML or
similar methods), the structural model can be retrieved and the constraint
can be tested.
4 The Nonlinear Case
In this section, we consider the case of a nonlinear budget constraint. This
generalization is particularly attractive for analyzing the incidence of income
tax on household labor supply.
4.1 Basic Framework
We maintain the essential assumptions of the collective setting but we give
up the linearity of the budget constraint. Precisely, we adopt the following
assumption:
10Such heterogeneity may come from the preferences and from the sharing rule.
14Assumption S2 Thebudgetset S isgiven by h(Lm;Lf ;wm;wf;y) > Cm+
Cf, 1 > Lm > 0, 1 > Lf > 0, Cm > 0 and Cf > 0, where the function h(¢)
is in…nitely di¤erentiable, increasing in all its arguments and concave in Lm
and Lf.
Two remarks are in order. First, we assume that the budget set is per-
fectly observed by the economist. This is essential for deriving the results of
this section. Second, the concavity of h implies that the budget set is con-
vex. Consequently, the solutions of (¯ P) are well-behaved functions (instead
of correspondences).
The next step is to de…ne a generalization of the sharing rule. When the
budget set is convex, the decision process can be decentralized as previously.
To do this, we de…ne a pair of shadow wages as follows:
!




f(wm;wf;y) = hLf(¹ L
m; ¹ L
f ;wm;wf;y): (14)
They coincide with the marginal rates of transformation between leisure and
consumption computed at the equilibrium. We also de…ne a shadow income
as follows:







This function gives the necessary income such that, at the equilibrium, the
budget constraint would be saturated if wages was given by !m and !f.
Finally, we can put forward the following lemma.
Lemma 5 Let (¹ Lm; ¹ Lf) be a pair of labor supplies consistent with collective
rationality conditionally on S2. Then, there exist a pair of functions ( ¹ Cm; ¹ Cf)
and a pair of functions (½m;½f), with
P






i) subject to Ci ¡ !
iLi = ½
i, L
i > 0, (P00
i )
for any (wm;wf;y) 2 IR3
++.
Proof. An application of the Second Theoremof Welfare Economics. Q.E.D.
As before, the decision process can be seen as a two-stage budgeting one.
In the …rst step, the members agree on some shadow wages and some intra-
household distribution of the shadow income. In the second step, they freely
15choose their own labor supply and consumption subject to their speci…c bud-










where ½ = ½m and ´ ¡ ½ = ½f. The function ½ can be seen as the natural
generalization of the sharing rule introduced in Section 3. We also note
that the shadow wages and income are observed by the economist, since the
budget set is supposed to be known.
4.2 Identi…cation and Testability
To simplify, we suppose that both spouses work, i.e. (wm;wf;y) 2 P. How-
ever, the generalization to nonworking spouses is elementary. Then, we im-
pose a regularity condition on labor supplies and the budget constraint:
Assumption R2 Labor supplies ¹ Lm(wm;wf;y) and ¹ Lf(wm;wf;y) and the
budget constraint h(Lm;Lf ;wm;wf;y) are such that










¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
6= 0
for any (wm;wf;y) 2 P.
This condition excludes some very unusual budget constraints11 but is
generically ful…lled in most useful cases; an example with income tax is
given below.
If R2 is satis…ed, by the Theorem of Implicit Functions, we can locally
express the actual variables wf;wm and y as a function of the shadow vari-







f(!f;´ ¡ '(!m;!f;´)); (19)
11A trivial example of inappropriate budget constraint is given by the following form
h(Lm + Lf;wm;wf;y). In this case, the husband and the wife are characterized by the
same shadow wage and R2 is obviously not satis…ed.




The functions ^ Lm and ^ Lf can be computed fromthe traditional laborsupplies
and the budget constraint. Furthermore, under our assumptions, they are
in…nitely di¤erentiable in all their arguments. For any (!m;!f;´) such that
^ Lm
´ ¢ ^ Lf













The next theorem establishes that some structural elements can be re-
trieved and testable constraints are generated from the observation of both
labor supplies.
Theorem 2 Let (¹ Lm; ¹ Lf) be a pair of labor supplies consistent with collec-
tive rationality conditionally on S2. Let us assume R2 and, for any (!m;!f;´),
^ Lm
´ ¢ ^ Lf
´ 6= 0 and ^ A ^ B´ ¡ ^ B!f 6= ^ B ^ A´ ¡ ^ A!m. Then the sharing rule ½ is iden-
ti…ed up to an additive constant ² on P. Moreover, for each choice of ²,
preferences represented by um and uf are uniquely identi…ed. Finally, the
labor supplies must satisfy testable restrictions under the form of partial dif-
ferential equations.
Proof. The ' – rule is retrieved from (18) and (19) and Lemma 2. Then,
the usual sharing rule can be obtained with the de…nitions (13), (14) and
(15). Q.E.D.
4.3 Labor Supply and Income Taxation
As an illustration, we consider a model of labor supply with income taxation.
In this case, after tax wages depend on the tax law and total hours worked.
4.3.1 Characteristics of Tax Systems
In the United-States and several other countries, the base of the tax system
is the household income as a whole. Disposable income is then given by
h(wm ¢ L
m + wf ¢ L
f + y); (20)
17with h0 > 0.12 For this form, R2 is generically satis…ed. To illustrate this, let
us de…ne the total household income as E(wf;wm;y) = wf ¹ Lf + wm¹ Lm + y.
Then, using a simple computation, it can be shown that R2 is satis…ed if
h
0 6= h
00 ¢ (Ey ¢ (E ¡ y) ¡ Ewfwf ¡ Ewmwm):
Moreover, the tax schedule is to a large extent progressive (i.e. h00 6 0). If
not, the budget set is often approximated in empirical applications, by its
convex hull. Finally, the tax rates …t a step function.13 If the household
income is in the kth bracket, the shadow wages and income are then given
by
!f = wf ¢ (1 ¡ tk); !m = wm ¢ (1 ¡ tk); (21)
´ = Bk ¡ T(Bk) ¡ (Bk ¡ y) ¢ (1 ¡ tk); (22)
where tk is the marginal tax rate in the kth bracket, Bk is the lower limit of
that bracket and T(Bk) is the amount of income tax corresponding to Bk.
4.3.2 Measuring the Incidence of Income Taxation
A large quantity of literature in both public and labor economics is inter-
ested in evaluating the disincentive and distributional e¤ects of income tax.
However, these studies suppress the analysis of intra-household resource al-
location by adopting the unitary approach. Apps and Rees (1988) and Brett
(1998) underline that this is allowable only if the household allocates in-
come exactly in accordance with the social welfare function of the planner.
If not, traditional analysis with a single utility function might be seriously
misleading.
Theoretically, the collective approach permits us to analyze the intra-
household redistributive e¤ectsof…scal reforms. Thebasic question iswhether
the impact of tax parameters on the sharing rule, and consequently on labor
supply, can be retrieved from current data. In fact, the answer depends on
the structure of ½. To begin with, we de…ne ± as a set of tax parameters (e.g.,
12There are other types of tax systems. For example, the base of the tax system may
also be the spouses’ income. The disposable income is then given by h(wm ¢ Lm) + h(
wf ¢ Lf) + y.
13Since the Second Theorem of Welfare Economics is not based on the smoothness of
the budget constraint, a pair of shadow wages can be de…ned everywhere. But, at the step
points, these wages are unobserved for the economist and the preceding results are thus
invalidated. However, this problem is likely negligible in empirical applications.
18one or several tax rates which seem especially important or some statistics
which summarize the tax system) and recall that, under regularity condi-
tions, the sharing rule can be written as a function of !m;!f and ´: If ± does
not operate in ' as a speci…c argument,











f and ~ ´ have obvious de…nitions, we say that the intra-household
redistributive impact of the tax system is neutral. If so, a change in the
tax parameters in‡uences household behavior only through a change in the
shadow variables. Since the derivatives of the ' – rule are identi…able, it is
clear that the impact of the tax parameters on the intra-household distribu-
tion of income and on household labor supply can be empirically evaluated
if we use (23) and apply the Implicit Functions Theorem to (18) and (19).
Still, the assumption of neutrality is not insigni…cant. For instance, let
us consider the bargaining model of McElroy and Horney (1981). In this
model, the intra-household allocation is determined by the Nash solution of
a cooperative game where the threat points are given by the utility levels
obtained when divorce is involved. Then, if the base of the tax system
is household income, it is plausible that an increase in the progressiveness
of the tax schedule, because it smooths the respective …nancial situations
of each spouse in the case of divorce, tends to decrease inequalities within
the household as well as between households. But this implication of the
progressiveness cannot be reduced to a modi…cation of the shadow wages or
the shadow income. In this case, ' directly depends on ±:









If so, we may wonder whether the e¤ect of tax parameters on the intra-
household distribution of income is retrievable. Actually, the answer is posi-
tive if we have data where some variability in the tax parameters is observed.















± and ^ L
f
± can be estimated using the usual techniques. Moreover,
the second equality is a testable constraint induced by the presence of tax pa-
rameters. Finally, the intra-household redistributive neutrality can be tested
19as '± = 0. In a sense, this may also be seen as a test of the income pooling
hypothesis since these parameters are not expected to have a direct impact
under the unitary approach.
In principle, such data, with some variability in the tax parameters, can
be constructed. It su¢ces to have a panel or a time-series of cross-sections
provided that the tax law changes during the period of observation or a set of
cross-sections coming from various countries characterized by di¤erent …scal
legislations. In particular, the PSID is especially convenient for that purpose
because it contains these two kinds of variations. Nevertheless, it might be
di¢cult, in practice, to choose the most relevant parameters of the tax system
since we do not have a theoretical model which explains the e¤ects of tax on
household bargaining. This is essentially an empirical issue open for future
investigation.
4.3.3 A Simple Parametric Example
Toillustratethe resultsof thissection, we considerthefunctional formused in
Section 3.3 for the labor supplies, expressed in terms of the shadow variables,
and introduce an additive term for the tax parameters:
L
m = a0 + a1!f + a2!m + a3!f!m + a4´ + a5´
2 + a6±; (26)
L
f = b0 + b1!f + b2!m + b3!f!m + b4´ + b5´
2 + b6±; (27)
where !f, !m and ´ are de…ned by (21) and (22). Disposable income is thus
assumed to be given by (20). If we condition on a particular tax system
(characterized by the vector of tax parameters ± = ±
¤), we can rede…ne the
constants: a¤
0 = a0 +a6±
¤ and b¤
0 = b0+b6±
¤. Therefore, using the preceding
results, we can show that the sharing rule has the following functional form:
' = k
¤
0 + k1!f + k2!m + k3!f!m + k4´ + k5´
2;
where k1;k2;k3;k4 and k5 are de…ned by (8) and k¤
0 = k0 + k6±
¤. If ± is








Moreover, this relation yields a testable constraint: a6 ¢ b3 = b6 ¢ a3. Finally,
the neutrality of the tax system can be tested by verifying k6 = 0.
20A straightforward method for estimating this model is to introduce unob-
servable heterogeneity in both labor supplies and follow the FIML framework
developed by Hausman (1981). Still, this may be cumbersome. A simpler
approach is to account for the endogeneity of the regressors by the Condi-
tional FIML method. Natural instruments for !f;!m and ´ are then given
by wf;wm and y.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we present two closely related extensions of the collective model
of labor supply. First, we take into account participatory decisions. Second,
we consider nonlinear budget constraints. We show that, in both cases, the
main conclusions of Chiappori can be generalized. Finally, we study how to
measure the incidence of income tax on household labor supply.
We show that, in the collective approach, simulations of …scal reforms
pose additional problems. The incidence of a change in tax parameters on
labor supply is generally indeterminate when usual cross-section data are
used. This indeterminacy can intuitively be explained by the fact that the
collective model is not completely structural. By this we mean that the
process which leads to intra-household distribution is not explicitly speci…ed.
Theoretically, this indeterminacy could be solved by a model which explains
how the resources are actually shared within the household. Such models
exist in family economics (e.g., McElroy and Horney (1981)) but are not
easily implemented empirically. The alternative approach is to use richer
data where changes in tax parameters are observed. This provides a very
interesting direction for future empirical research.
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